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Abstract 
Current knowledge accessibility research assumes primed trait concepts to have no 
biasing  effects  beyond  the  encoding  stage.  In  a  series  of studies,  we  challenge  this 
assumption. We predict that trait concepts still can influence the person judgments of a 
predictor who previously stored the target person information through selective retrieval 
of trait congruent information.  Our results consistently reveal assimilation effects when 
participants  are  primed  with  traits  at judgment.  Moreover,  we  identify  two  boundary 
conditions  provide further evidence of the  underlying  selective retrieval  process.  First, 
assimilation effects only occur when stored target person instances apply to the externally 
activated knowledge and, second, when no prior target person impression is formed. 
- 2 -Introduction 
The focus of this paper is on the effect of subtle external cues on the judgments an 
actor  makes  about  another  person.  In  a  marketing  context  these  judgments  are  often 
predictions  of  another  person's  product  attitudes  or  preferences.  Such  predictive 
judgments are necessary whenever a consumer acts as an agent for another consumer, or 
when  one  is  buying  a  product  as  a  gift  for  someone  else.  Very  specific  also  to  the 
marketing context is that the external cues that might influence these judgments are often 
embedded in the retailing environment at the time of purchase, and that the agent already 
possesses at least some knowledge on the target person about whom the predictions are 
made before entering the purchase episode. There is  strong evidence that people,  when 
they judge another person, are unlikely to search memory for all information that might be 
relevant for their judgment. Instead they tend to base their judgment on only the subset of 
knowledge that is made more readily accessible by the context in which the judgment is 
made (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974). 
Effects of external context on such judgments are amply documented as  'priming 
effects'  in the  social cognition research tradition.  However,  within the  social cognition 
field,  the  debate  on the  precise impact of primes  encountered at the time of judgment 
('post-priming')  is  far  from  resolved.  We  will  try  to  resolve  some  of the  remaining 
controversies on this matter, thereby laying the groundwork for future consumer research 
studying  the  effect  of  subtle  environmental  cues,  like  store  atmosphere  or  product 
advertisements, on predictions of an other's product attitudes, like when buying a birthday 
gift. 
We introduce the specific questions addressed in  this  article as  following a brief 
overview of prior social cognition research on knowledge accessibility effects on  person 
impressions. 
- 3 -Knowledge activation in a nutshell 
Two  different  streams  of research  studied  the  effects  of knowledge  activation 
(Stapel,  Koomen  and  van  der Pligt  1997).  On the  one  hand,  social cognition research 
investigated  the  impact  of  activated  knowledge  on  the  subsequent  interpretation  of 
ambiguous stimuli. In this kind of research, people were typically primed with personality 
traits.  This  priming generally induces  the  assimilation  of a vague  or ambiguous  target 
person towards the valence of the primed concept. A frequently cited and often replicated 
example is a study by Srull and Wyer (1979) (see also Higgins, Rholes and Jones  1977, 
Wyer and  Srull  1989). They used a priming task in  which they exposed participants to 
hostile or kind behavioral descriptions that either activate the "hostility" or the "kindness" 
construct.  Participants were then  asked to  judge a vague target person,  Donald,  whose 
behaviors were close to  neutral  with respect to  kindness.  They found  that Donald was 
perceived as  being more hostile when primed with hostility and more kind when primed 
with the kindness concept. 
In the social judgment research tradition, on the other hand, the basic assumption 
has  been  that  all  judgments  are  comparative  (Eiser  1990)  and  that,  by  consequence, 
accessible person exemplars are used when making social judgments. The typical finding 
in this type of research is nicely illustrated in a study by Herr, Sherman and Fazio (1983). 
They  found  that  when  participants  were  primed  with  moderate  exemplars  of animal 
ferocity  or size,  assimilation  effects  appeared when  the  participants judged a fictitious 
animal  on  ferocity  or  size.  No  effect  was  found  for  a  real  animal.  However,  when 
participants were primed with extreme exemplars, the priming produced contrast effects 
both for fictitious and real animals. Comparable results were found in Herr's (1986) study 
that looks  at the effects of exemplars,  varying  in  their degree  of hostility,  on  kindness 
judgments of the vague target person used by Srull and Wyer (1979). The explanation of 
these findings was that when a target person is vague or ambiguous, the judge is searching 
for an appropriate identifying category like the moderate exemplar. When the exemplar is 
too extreme, it falls outside the latitude of acceptance and contrast effects emerge. 
Stapel, Koomen and van der Pligt (1996,  1997) combined both research streams in 
their  two-stage  interpretation/comparison  model  (see  also  Stapel  and  Koomen  2001). 
-4 -According to this model, vague and ambiguous behaviors are interpreted and judged with 
respect to the construct that is most accessible at the time the information is received. This 
means  that  during  encoding,  the  activated  construct  can  serve  as  an  interpretation 
framework,  resulting  in  assimilation  effects.  Later  at  the  time  of judgment,  however, 
accessible information might affect the impression formation  as  a comparison standard, 
leading to  contrast effects. Applied to  the two types of primes, this  model predicts that 
person exemplars can be used both as  an interpretation framework when encoding target 
person information and as  a comparison standard at the judgment stage. Trait concepts, 
lacking comparison relevance, only affect the encoding of vague or ambiguous stimuli. 
In  this paper,  we  examine the effect of activated knowledge  after the  encoding 
stage. More specifically we propose that the knowledge activated during the judgment of 
the target person will not only be used as  a comparison standard (as found in previous 
studies) but that it will also affect the kind of target person information that is  retrieved. 
We assume that, in order to make their judgment, we assume that consumers first have to 
retrieve diagnostic cues. We further expect that this retrieval can also be influenced by the 
knowledge that is activated at that time. Our view is consistent with Stapel and Koomen 
(2001, p.  230) who also note: 
"Knowledge accessibility may determine  which  stimuli are  given  attention,  how 
those stimuli are encoded,  the way in  which they are stored and retrieved from memory, 
and how they are evaluated and judged". 
Before we take a closer look at the studies that investigated the impact of external 
cues at the time of judgment, we first discuss how target person information is  stored in 
memory and what types of stored target person  information can be distinguished.  Both 
factors  can have an  important  influence  on  how the  activated knowledge  at  judgment 
affects the perception of the target person. 
- 5 -Encoding of the target person information 
Many prior studies have documented how information is encoded in the absence of 
explicit instructions. A lot of this research was conducted by Uleman and colleagues (see 
Uleman, Newman and Moskowitz 1996 for a review), who argued that people engage in 
spontaneous trait inference when they are exposed to the behavior of others. Typically, the 
evidence for spontaneous trait inference comes from experiments in which people attend 
to  descriptions  of others'  behavior.  These  behavioral  descriptions  are  as  concrete  as 
possible and clearly imply specific personality traits  (e.g.  "The librarian carries  the  old 
woman's groceries across the street."). Winter and Uleman (1984) for instance found that, 
although participants were  not encouraged to  form  impressions,  the  traits  subsequently 
served as  effective retrieval cues for these behavioral instances. These spontaneous trait 
inferences  were  initially  thought  to  reflect  the  spontaneous  attribution  of traits  to  the 
people  performing  the  behaviors.  The  conclusion  drawn  from  these  studies  has  been 
questioned by others (e.g. Bassili 1989, Claeys 1990), and also Uleman later admitted that 
their findings not necessarily prove that the inferences refer to  the actor. It is also quite 
possible  that  the  spontaneous  inferences  refer  not  to  the  actor  but  to  the  behavior 
descriptions  themselves  (Uleman  et  al.  1993).  More  recent  research  suggests  that  it 
depends on the circumstances. For instance, the goals and motivation of the perceiver are 
found to affect the likelihood that trait inferences activate dispositions or actor-trait links 
instead of mere behavioral descriptions (Uleman and Moskowitz 1994). Participants who 
had an impression formation goal when reading trait-implying behaviors were found to 
attribute those traits to the actor, while those having a memorization task activated abstract 
behavior labels. This view also comports with the person memory literature. This literature 
indicates that social information tends not to be organized around person categories unless 
the perceiver is given an instructional set facilitating such organization (e.g. Srull 1983). 
The fact that people do not spontaneously infer target person traits when they encode the 
target person's behaviors has important implications for the effect of activated knowledge 
at judgment stage (see infra). 
- 6 -Different types of target person information 
The information people possess about another person consists of different 
behavioral instances, they observed themselves or heard being described by others. Based 
on the applicability of the activated construct to the target person's behavioral instances, 
different types of target person information can be distinguished (Higgins and Brendl 
1995, Higgins 1996; Stapel and Schwarz 1998). A first type is the unambiguous target 
person information. This target person consists of behaviors that only apply to one trait 
construct and that all point towards the same pole of this construct. An example of this is 
target person information that exclusively contains extremely hostile behavioral instances. 
Target  person  information  can  also  be  ambiguous.  Ambiguous  target  person 
information  consists  of behavioral  instances  that  all  apply  to  at  least  two  alternative 
constructs  that  are  equally  applicable.  An  example  of such  a  description  is  the  target 
person used by Carlston (1980) and described with behaviors that each individually could 
be interpreted as  either kind or dishonest (e.g., "Michael helps a friend complete a take-
home exam").  These target persons lack evaluative clarity because the  meaning of the 
behavior itself is ambiguous. 
A target person can also be missing evaluative certainty not because the individual 
behaviors  are  ambiguous,  but because  the  combination  of behaviors  has  contradictory 
implications. These target persons are defined as mixed. One type of mixed target persons 
has some behaviors that imply a construct at one pole while others imply the opposite pole 
of the same construct. Skowronski, Carlston and Isham (1993) for instance constructed a 
behavioral description that both included intelligent (e.g., "he is a skilled craftsman") and 
unintelligent (e.g., "he did not well in school") behaviors. Another possibility is that some 
behavioral instances strongly imply one construct and others a different but evaluatively 
opposite construct.  Carlston  (1980)  for  instance  made  use  of three  behaviors  implying 
kindness (e.g., "When Michael learned that John had failed his exam, he sought John out 
to console him") and three behaviors implying dishonesty (e.g., "Michael copied an article 
from the JESP and submitted it as his final research project in his psychology class"). 
- 7 -Finally,  there  is  also  the  vague target  person whose behaviors  are  only  weakly 
related to the activated trait construct. The vaguely hostile Donald description of Srull and 
Wyer (1979) consisted of six behaviors that all scored around the midpoint of a kindness 
scale (e.g., "a salesman knocked at the door, but Donald refused to let him enter"). Since 
these behaviors do not contain much information with respect to the activated kindness or 
hostility trait, this target person also lacks evaluative clarity. 
Although the above classification clearly shows the diversity of used target person 
descriptions, research into knowledge activation has  paid relatively little attention to  its 
effect on  social judgments (Higgins  and Brendl  1995).  Stapel  and  Schwarz (1998),  for 
instance, found that although trait primes led to  assimilation effects for both ambiguous 
and mixed target person descriptions, the underlying mechanism is  quite different. Trait 
priming was found to play an interpretative role in the disambiguation of the information 
in ambiguous descriptions, while it elicited the selective processing of some, rather than 
other, features of the mixed target person information. 
Knowledge activation at the judgment stage 
According to  the interpretation/comparison model the only knowledge activation 
effects  that  can  appear  after  encoding  are  contrast  effects.  More  specifically  Stapel, 
Koomen and van der P1igt (1997) argued that only activated extreme exemplars are likely 
to  result in  a contrast effect because they  are  more distinct and have more comparison 
relevance  than  trait  concepts.  They  supported  the  argument  by  first  supplying  the 
participants with a vague Donald description and subsequently priming them with either 
trait concepts ("nice, gentle and friendly" vs.  "mean, violent and unfriendly") or extreme 
person exemplars ("Aladdin, Ghandi and Mandela" vs. "Dracula, Stalin and Hitler"). Only 
the extreme exemplar post-primes affected the subsequent kindness ratings. Post-priming 
with trait concepts did not influence the kindness perception of Donald. The same pattern 
was also found with respect to the participants' kindness ratings of a good friend.  These 
findings were consistent with an earlier study of Srull and Wyer (1980, experiment 3) who 
post-primed with hostility trait concepts and manipulated the  number of primes (15  vs. 
35), the delay (no delay vs.  24 hours) and type of delay (between stimulus presentation 
- 8 -and priming vs.  between priming and judgment). In  none of these conditions the  post-
primes had any effect on the ratings of the target person. 
At this point we might be tempted to conclude that the activation of trait concepts 
does not have any effect at the judgment stage. In the present study, we want to challenge 
this. We predict that activated trait concepts can have an effect on target person judgments 
even when the target person information was previously stored in  memory. As discussed 
above, when no encoding goal is specified, this stored information very likely consists of 
behavioral instances  that are  spontaneously linked to  their applicable trait  (Srull  1983, 
Uleman  and  Moskowitz  1994).  Since  people  are  generally  not expected to  have  made 
personality inferences about the focus trait at encoding, they will have to rely on the stored 
behavioral information at the moment when they are asked to judge the target person on 
the focus trait. When a trait concept is  activated at this judgment stage, it is expected to 
affect the judgment because prime-congruent features will become more accessible. The 
studies on spontaneous trait inferences, for instance, found that the traits corresponding to 
the  behaviors  serve  as  effective  retrieval  cues  for  these  behaviors  (e.g.,  Winter  and 
Uleman  1984).  The higher accessibility of behaviors congruent with  the  activated trait 
could be interpreted as a cue for the frequency and probability of these behaviors (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973) and ultimately result in an assimilation effect at the prediction stage. 
Why  did  prevIOUS  post-priming  studies  find  no  effect  of  the  activated  trait 
concepts? One likely reason is that both the study of Srull and Wyer (1980) and Stapel et 
al. (1997) made use of a vague target person description with behaviors that, by definition, 
do not strongly apply to  the activated trait concept.  For this reason,  we  assume that the 
trait concept could not serve as  an effective retrieval cue. Another possible reason is that 
in both studies the participants were asked to  form an impression of the target person at 
the  encoding  stage.  Since  it  is  found  that  people  with  an  impression  formation  goal 
attributed the inferred trait directly to the target person (Uleman and Moskowitz 1994), the 
participants very likely recalled and used this inference at the judgment stage instead of 
basing their judgment on the  behavioral instances  (Carlston  1980,  Ostrom et  al.  1980, 
Srull  and  Wyer  1980).  In  the  present  studies,  we  will  experimentally  test  both 
explanations. 
- 9 -Study 1 
The  aim  of  this  study  was  twofold.  First,  and  in  contrast  with  the 
interpretation/comparison model of Stapel et al.  (1997), we wanted to find out if we could 
obtain an assimilation effect when a trait concept was activated at judgment stage. Second, 
we examined to what extent this assimilation effect depended on the type of target person 
information. We expected that the primed trait concept would increase the accessibility of 
behavioral instances that were congruent with this  trait.  Therefore,  we  expected that if 
people  had  encoded  mixed  target person  information  (kind  and  unkind behaviors),  an 
assimilation effect towards the primed trait valence would occur. More specifically, we 
expected that participants that were post-primed with kindness related traits would judge 
the target person as kinder. For participants post-primed with traits related to hostility, the 
perception of the target person would be less kind. Next, we also expected that participants 
provided with a vague target person would not be affected by the activated trait concepts. 
Since  the  behaviors  of the  vague  target  person  did  not  apply  to  the  primed  trait,  we 
expected that the participants that are post-primed with  kindness traits  would judge the 
target person equally kind as  those  that were  primed with  hostility traits.  In  short,  we 
expected  an  assimilation  effect  of the  post-primes  after  people  read  the  mixed  target 
person  description  and  no  effect  of the  post-primes  when  people  had  encoded  the 
information of a vague target person. 
Pretest 
Selection of  behavioral descriptions 
We compiled a set of 15  different situations (e.g., "D. is talking with  a group of 
friends, when they see a girl hurry, stumble and fall. D. makes his friends aware of this."). 
Each situation was followed by a vague (e.g., "They see that the girl hurries back on her 
feet and they continue their conversation."), a kind (e.g., "D. hurries to the girl, helps her 
back on  her feet  and  asks  if she has hurt herself."),  or an  unkind  ("And they  all  start 
laughing.  Ashamed,  the  girl  hurries  up  and  leaves.")  behavioral  variant.  In  total  45 
- 10 -behavioral  descriptions  were  constructed.  These  behaviors  were  divided  over  three 
questionnaires each containing one of the variants for each situation. Each questionnaire 
consisted of five kind, five unkind and five vague individual behaviors. 
Seventy pre-test respondents were randomly given one of the three questionnaires 
in which we asked them to rate the 15 behavioral instances along a scale from 1 ("not at 
all kind") to 7 ("extremely kind"). From this pool, we selected six situations for which we 
had a vague behavioral variant and either a kind or an unkind variant. This selection was 
based  on  two  criteria.  First,  the  kindness  rating  of the  vague  variant  did  not  differ 
significantly  from  four,  the  neutral  point  on  the  scale,  and  second,  the  rating  was 
significantly higher (lower) than its unkind (kind) variant. This reduced our initial pool to 
a set of six vague (M =  3.84), three kind (M =  6.20) and three unkind (M =  1.81) instances. 
The six selected behaviors that were found to be vague with respect to kindness formed 
the description of our vague target person. The three kind and unkind behaviors formed 
the description of our mixed target person. 
Test of  target person descriptions 
To  test  whether  the  overall  kindness  of the  vague  and  mixed  target  person 
descriptions  was  perceived  as  identical,  37  respondents  were  asked  to  rate  the  target 
person  description,  featuring  a  man  named  Diederik  with  respect  to  kindness.  They 
received a two-page bundle. On the first page,  after Diederik was briefly introduced as  a 
student,  we  asked  them  to  read  several  episodes  taken  from  his  life.  Half  of  the 
participants then read the vague target person description, which was the followingl : 
Diederik strolls down a neighborhood that is  unfamiliar to  him.  Along his way he sees  a 
tourist with a city map, who is clearly searching for something. Because Diederik himself 
hardly knows his way around in this neighborhood, he passes the tourist. 
Diederik meets an  acquaintance at a vending machine. The acquaintance tells him that he 
planned to buy a soft drink but unfortunately he ran out of coins. At that moment, Diederik 
notices that he has no cash either. 
Diederik is  talking with a group of friends,  when they see a girl hun-y,  stumble and fall. 
Diederik makes his friends aware of this, but in the meantime the girl hun-ies back on her 
feet. So they continue their conversation. 
1 These are translations. The descriptions used in our studies were in Dutch. Minor deviations due to 
translation are possible. 
- 11  -A friend  of Diederik is  preparing for  a very difficult exam.  Diederik,  an  expert in  that 
subject, knows that his friend has  a lot of problems with this course. However, Diederik 
can't help his friend because, at the same time, he has to prepare for another exam himself. 
Diederik runs into a friend  in  the  street and they start talking.  As  they  are about to  say 
goodbye, Diederik asks  him about his plans for the evening. His friend tells him that he 
would really love to  go to  a sports event but he has  no transportation to  the sports center 
that is situated further down town. Diederik tells him that it is a pity his friend has to miss 
out on the game and they part. 
On Friday evening, just after Diederik finished his final exam, his friends ring at the door 
and ask him to go out and party. Although Diederik's girlfriend still has a difficult exam 
the next day, he decides to join them for a while. He promises to be back shortly. 
The other half of the participants were asked to read this mixed target person description: 
Diederik walks around in a neighborhood that is quite familiar to him. Along his way he 
sees a tourist with a city map clearly searching for something.  Diederik walks up  to  the 
man and together they try to find the right direction. 
Diederik meets an acquaintance at a vending machine. The acquaintance tells him that he 
planned to buy a soft drink but unfortunately he ran out of coins.  Diederik immediately 
proposes to lend him some money. 
Diederik is  talking with a group of friends,  when they see a girl hurry, stumble and fall. 
Diederik  makes  his  friends  aware  of what  he  has  just  seen  and  they  start  laughing. 
Ashamed, the girl hurries up and leaves. 
A friend  of Diederik is  preparing for  a very difficult exam.  Diederik,  an  expert in  that 
subject, knows that his friend has a lot of problems with this course. However, he refuses 
to help him prepare this exam. He doesn't want his friend to  get a better grade thanks to 
him. 
Diederik runs  into a friend  in the  street and they start talking.  As  they are  about to  say 
goodbye, Diederik asks him about his plans for the evening. His friend tells him that he 
would really love to go to a sports event but he has  no transportation to the sports center 
that is  situated further  down town.  Diederik,  who  owns  a car,  immediately proposes to 
drive his friend  to  the sports event.  This way,  his  friend  will  still be  able  to  follow  the 
game. 
On Friday evening, just after Diederik finished his final exam, his friends ring at the door 
and ask him to go out and party. Although Diederik's girlfriend still has a difficult exam 
the next they,  and she could use his support, Diederik decides to join them. That evening 
he has the time of his life and it is early in the morning when he returns home, drunk. 
Two  alternative  versions  of the  questionnaires,  changing  the  sequence  of the 
individual behaviors, were constructed. On the next page, the respondents were asked to 
rate Diederik on a seven-point kindness scale (l =  not at all kind, 7 =  very kind). They 
were not allowed to return to the previous page. Irrespective of the version, respondents 
- 12 -perceived the mixed target person (M =  3.85) as not different compared to the vague one 
(M =  3.86) (F(l, 25) < .01, p> .98) on the kindness dimension. Also neither the ratings of 
the mixed nor the vague target person differed significantly from the midpoint of the scale. 
Study la 
Method 
Participants and design 
The participants were 82 students at Katholieke Hogeschool Leuven, participating 
in  partial  fulfillment  of  course  requirements.  They  were  randomly  assigned  to  the 
conditions of a 2 (target person description: vague vs. mixed) x 2 (prime valence: kind vs. 
unkind) between subjects design. The dependent variables were the participants' kindness 
judgment and overall impression of the target person Diederik. 
Procedure and materials 
The study was part of a general testing session in which participants were asked to 
complete several tasks. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were placed in individual 
cubicles. The participants were told that they would participate in a number of unrelated 
studies. They were requested to perform a sequence of four tasks: (a) a reading task; (b) a 
filler task;  (c) the task involving the priming procedure and (d)  the judgment task. After 
the participants completed these tasks, they were requested to fill out a post-experimental 
questionnaire. This questionnaire probed for their awareness of the priming manipulation 
or suspicions about any  relatedness  among  tasks  (similar to  Higgins  and Brendl  1995). 
Finally, we thanked them for their participation. When the entire study was finished, we 
debriefed them.  Five  participants  were  not  included in  the  analyses.  Four participants 
suspected a connection between the priming and judgment task and one participant failed 
to correctly execute the priming task. 
- l3 -Reading and filler task 
In  this  first  task,  the  participants  are  asked  to  carefully  read  the  target  person 
description  presented  on  the  first  page.  Half of the  participants  read  the  vague  target 
person description while the other half read the mixed target person description.  When 
turning to the next page, they were asked to count down from 60 to zero in steps of three. 
After this small counting exercise, the participants handed in their package and proceeded 
to an unrelated filler task. Both the counting exercise and filler task were intended merely 
to mask the manipulation of this experiment. 
Priming manipulation 
Next, the participants were asked to  fill out a scrambled sentence task (see Srull 
and Wyer 1979). The task was introduced as  a "language skill" test and consisted of 14 
scrambled five-word sets. The participants' assignment was to organize the word sets into 
meaningful, grammatically correct sentences using four out of the five  words.  For each 
word set only one solution was possible2.  Prime words were embedded in eight of the 14 
word  groups.  For half of the  participants  these  prime words  were  related to  kindness: 
sweet,  gentle,  kind,  pleasant,  good,  polite,  friendly  and  helpful.  In the  unkind valence 
condition these traits were: mean, hostile, disagreeable, coarse, bad, impolite, unfriendly, 
and rude 3. 
Judgment task 
During this  final  task,  the  participants  are  asked  to  judge Diederik on  7-point-
scales with respect to kindness (l = not at all friendly, 7 = very friendly). We also asked 
their  overall  impression  of the  target  person  (1  = extremely  negative,  7 = extremely 
positive). 
2 One example of such a word set is: "bush, big, a, garden, planting". The correct answer is: "planting a big 
bush". 
3 In our studies, the prime words were presented in Dutch. The Dutch prime words related to kindness were: 
"lief', "zachtaardig", "sympathiek", "aardig", "goed", "beleefd", "vriendelijk" and "hulpvaardig". The 
unkind traits were "gemeen", "kwaadaardig", "onsympathiek", "grof', "slecht", "onbeleefd", 
"onvriendelijk" en "onbeschoft". 
- 14 -Results and discussion 
We performed a 2 (target person description: mixed vs. vague) x 2 (prime valence: 
kind vs.  unkind)  between-subjects ANOVA on  the  kindness judgment. We  obtained  a 
main  effect of target person description.  Rated kindness  is  higher for  the  mixed target 
person (M = 4.22) than for the vague one (M = 3.25) (F(1,  83) =  12.61, P < .001). More 
interestingly,  we  found  a  significant interaction between  target  person  description  and 
prime valence (F(I, 73) =  7.61, p < .03). The interaction means are shown in figure 2.1. 
FIGURE 1 
MEAN KINDNESS JUDGMENT AS A FUNCTION OF TARGET PERSON DESCRIPTION AND PRIME 
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As predicted, the data revealed a difference in  the mixed target person condition. 
When participants were post-primed with the kindness concept (M =  4.57) they judged the 
target person as kinder than when they were post-primed with the hostility concept (M = 
3.89). However, this difference was only marginally significant (F(I, 73) =  3.01, P < .09). 
The difference between kind and unkind primes was  not  significant in the vague target 
person condition (M = 2.95  vs.  M  = 3.53; F(l, 73) = 2.07, p  >.15). As expected, in the 
vague target person condition no assimilation effect was observed. 
The  same  ANOV  A  was  also  computed  with  the  general  impression  rating  as 
dependent measure. One participant who failed to complete this item was excluded from 
- 15 -the  analysis.  We obtained only  a  main  effect of target  person  type.  The mixed  target 
person (M = 3.78) was perceived as more positive than the vague target person (M = 3.26) 
(F(l, 72) =  5.01, p < .05). No effect of prime valence was found. 
The results provided some support for our expectations. When the description of 
the  target  person  consisted of mixed behaviors,  people  perceived  the  target  person  as 
kinder  when  kind  traits  were  activated  than  when  unkind  traits  were  activated.  This 
assimilation effect was only marginally significant, however. When the target person was 
vague,  no  assimilation effect of the  activated traits  was found.  The results even leaned 
towards a contrast effect. The persons who received the kind primes perceived the target 
person slightly more unkind than those primed with unkind traits. 
Study Ib 
In  this  study,  we  made  an  attempt  to  fine-tune  the  procedure  and  ran  the 
experiment on a second subject pool in  order to  find more convincing evidence for our 
expectations. 
Method 
Participants and design 
In  total 66 undergraduate students of Tilburg University participated in this study. 
Their participation  was  in  partial fulfillment of course requirements.  The experimental 
design  included  the  same  two  between-subjects  factors  as  in  study  lao  The  kindness 
judgment and  overall  impression  rating  of the  target person  were  again  the  dependent 
measures. 
- 16 -Procedure and materials 
The procedure was  similar to  the procedure in  study  la, except for  some minor 
adaptations. We changed the trait primes in an attempt to  obtain more symmetry in the 
prime effects. In the above study the data suggest a stronger impact of the kind compared 
to  the  unkind  trait  primes.  In  the  priming  task  of this  study,  the  primes  in  the  kind 
condition  were:  liked,  good-hearted,  sympathetic,  good,  polite,  helpful,  pleasant  and 
warm. The exact opposite of these traits was used in the unkind condition: disliked, evil-
hearted, unsympathetic, bad, impolite, unhelpful, unpleasant, and cold4. The word groups 
in  which  we  embedded the  prime  words  were  identical  for  both  conditions.  We  also 
extended the judgment task to  11  personality judgments. Each personality trait had to be 
rated on a seven-point scale. This was done to make it less obvious for the participants that 
kindness  was  the  focal  trait.  To  minimize  the  effect of the  other  trait  ratings  on  the 
kindness rating, it was second on the list, after the unrelated intelligence trait. At the end 
of this list,  we asked the participants to give their overall target person impression (1  = 
extremely negative, 7 =  extremely positive). 
Results and discussion 
Like in study 1a we conducted a 2 (target person description: mixed vs.  vague) x 2 
(prime  valence:  kind  vs.  unkind)  between-subjects  ANOV  A  on  the  kindness  and  the 
overall  impression  ratings.  With  respect  to  the  kindness  rating,  the  results  were  quite 
similar to  the findings of study  1a.  We found a main effect of target person description 
(F(I, 62) =  9.97, P <.01). The participants perceived the mixed target person (M =  3.72) as 
kinder than the vague target person (M = 2.94). Congruent with study 1b,  this effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction with prime valence (F(l, 62) = 4.65, P < .04). The 
means of this interaction are presented in figure 2.2. 
4 The Dutch prime words related to kindness were: "geliefd", "goedaardig", "sympathiek", "goed", 
"beleefd", "behulpzaam", "aangenaam" and "warm". The unkind traits were "ongeliefd", "kwaadaardig", 
"onsympathiek", "slecht", "onbeleefd", "onbehulpzaam", "onaangenaam" en "koud". 
- 17 -FIGURE 2 
MEAN KINDNESS JUDGMENT AS A FUNCTION OF TARGET PERSON DESCRIPTION AND PRIME 
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Subsequent  analyses  revealed,  consistent  with  study  la,  an  assimilation  effect 
when the target person description was mixed (F(l, 62) =  3.94, p < .06). People rated the 
mixed target person higher on kindness when they were post-primed with kind traits (M = 
4.06), compared to unkind traits (M =  3.38). When the target person condition was vague, 
however, no significant difference between the kind and unkind prime conditions appeared 
(M =  2.76 vs. M =  3.12) (F(l, 62) = 1.10, p > .29). 
This pattern was also found with respect to the overall impressions. As depicted in 
figure 3, the post-prime effect interacted significantly with target person description (F(l, 
61) =  6,41, p < .02). 
More specifically, the mixed target person was judged more positive in the kind (M 
=  3.88) compared to the unkind prime valence condition (M =  3.06) (F(l, 61) =  4.98, p < 
.03). With respect to the vague target person, again no significant effect of prime valence 
is found (M = 2.81 vs. M =  3.30) (F(l, 61) = 1.80, P > .18). 
- 18 -FIGURE 3 
OVERALL TARGET PERSON JUDGMENT AS A FUNCTION OF TARGET PERSON DESCRIPTION AND 
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The results of this study confirm our findings in study 1a. When the target person 
information is mixed, the data reveal the expected assimilation effect of the post-primes. 
When only vague behaviors of the target  person  are  available,  the  post-primes  do  not 
affect the  kindness judgment.  Nonetheless,  we  are  still  concerned by  two  unexpected 
observations.  First,  we  consistently  found  a  significant  main  effect  of target  person 
description. The vague target person is perceived as less kind than the mixed target person. 
Second,  there  also  seems  to  be  a  consistent,  although  not  significant,  tendency  for  a 
contrast effect in the vague target person condition. Awareness of the priming events is 
often  found  to  unpredictably  influence  the  effect  of  target  person  knowledge  on 
subsequent  target  person  judgments  (Higgins  1996).  Since  post-primes  are  provided 
between  two  target  person-related  tasks  (i.e.  reading  and  judgment task),  the  present 
procedure was especially vulnerable to  this awareness effect. We tried to remedy this in 
study 2. 
- 19 -Study 2 
Although the results of study  1 were reasonably satisfactory and in line with our 
expectations, we wanted to filter out all possible confounding effects of prime awareness. 
We opted for a  subliminal priming procedure in study 2.  Using this approach,  we  also 
tested the  robustness  of our findings  to  another priming  procedure.  Instead of priming 
participants with word sets implying either kind or unkind behaviors, we used the actual 
traits as primes in this study. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Sixty-one  students  of Tilburg  University  took  part  in  this  experiment  to  fulfill 
course  requirements.  The  experimental  design  included  two  between-subjects  factors: 
target person  description  (vague  vs.  mixed)  and  prime valence (kinds  vs.  unkind).  The 
participant's kindness judgment and overall impression of the target person were again the 
dependent measures. 
Procedure and materials 
After the participants entered the laboratory, they took place in individual cubicles 
and were told that they would  participate in a  sequence of unrelated tasks  they had to 
complete individually. The sequence of tasks consisted of:  (a) a reading task; (b) a word 
recognition task involving the subliminal priming procedure, (c) the judgment task and (d) 
a  post-experimental  questionnaire.  Finally,  participants  were  thanked  for  their 
participation and debriefed. 
- 20 -Reading task 
The reading task was identical to the tasks used in study 1. Participants were either 
asked  to  read  the  vague  target  person  description  consisting  of six  vague  behavioral 
instances or to read the mixed target person description with three kind and three unkind 
behaviors. 
Priming manipulation 
After  participants  finished  reading  the  target  person  description,  they  were 
presented with a word-recognition task.  Participants performed this task on  a computer. 
They were told they would see  14  letter strings appearing one by one  on  the computer 
screen.  Half of these letter strings were existing words, the other half were non-existing 
words. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation point on the computer screen. 
To start a trial the participants had to press the key  '2'. They had to decide as  quickly as 
possible whether or not a string was an existing word by pressing a key on the keyboard 
(' l' for existing word and '3' for a non-existing word). In order to get acquainted with this 
procedure, they started with four test trials. 
After the test trials the participants proceeded to the 14 actual trials. During these 
trials, the strings were preceded by subliminal primes. These primes were words that were 
presented for 17  ms and masked by a row of X's ("XXXXXXXXXXXX") remaining on 
the screen for 225 ms. The target word immediately followed this mask.  All participants 
were exposed to  7 different prime words, each used twice. The prime words were traits 
retained from the pretest.  In the kind prime valence condition these were:  liked,  good-
hearted, sympathetic, kind,  polite, helpful and pleasant. In the  unkind valence condition 
these traits were:  disliked,  evil-hearted,  unsympathetic,  unkind,  impolite,  unhelpful and 
unpleasant5.  The participants were randomly assigned to  one of the two  prime valence 
conditions. 
5 In Dutch, the kind primes were: "geliefd", "goedaardig", "sympathiek", "aardig", "beleefd", "behulpzaam" 
en "aangenaam". The unkind primes were: "ongeliefd", "kwaadaardig", "onsympathiek", "onaardig", 
"onbeleefd", "onbehulpzaam" en "onaangenaam". 
- 21  -Judgment task 
Like in study lb, participants were asked to judge the target person with respect to 
11  personality traits  on a  seven-point scale.  The focal trait  'kind'  was  the  second trait, 
after intelligence, the participants had to rate.  When all traits were rated, the participants 
were also  asked to  indicate their overall impression of the target person (1  = extremely 
negative, 7 =  extremely positive). 
Post-experimental questionnaire 
At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to complete a form 
that probed for awareness and suspicion about any relatedness among tasks (see funneled 
debriefing procedure,  Chartrand &  Bargh  1996). None of the participants could retrieve 
any of the primes or indicated any suspicion. 
Results 
A  2  (target  person  description:  mixed  vs.  vague)  x  2  (prime  valence:  kind vs. 
unkind)  between-subjects  ANOV  A  was  conducted  on  the  kindness  judgment.  As 
expected,  we  obtained  a  significant interaction  between  target  person  description  and 
prime valence (F(l, 73) = 8.85, p < .01). The means of this interaction are  presented in 
figure 4. 
- 22-FIGURE 4 
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Contrasts  between  the  kind  and  unkind  prime  valence  revealed  the  expected 
significant  difference  for  the  mixed  target  person  (F(1,  73) = 13.67,  p  < .001).  The 
participants judged the mixed target person as kinder in the kind valence condition (M = 
4.59) than in the unkind valence condition (M =  3.47). Also as predicted, we observed no 
difference for the vague target person (M = 3.94 vs.  M =  4.11) (F(1, 73) = .27, p > .60). 
Next, the contrast between the mixed and vague target person description is significant for 
both the kind (F(1, 73) = 4.79, p < .03) and the unkind primes (F(1, 73) = 4.10, p < .04). 
These data show that the participants who received the kind primes perceived the mixed 
target  person  (M = 4.59)  as  kinder  than  the  vague  target  person  (M = 3.94).  When 
receiving unkind primes, however, they rated the mixed target person (M = 3.47) as less 
kind than the  vague one (M = 4.11).  This indicates that compared to  the  vague target 
person  condition,  the  primes  result  in  kindness  ratings  that  are  congruent  with  their 
valence when the target person is mixed. 
The same ANOV  A was also computed on the overall judgment scores. As depicted 
in figure 5, the results show a significant interaction between target person description and 
prime valence (F(l, 73) =  8.59, p < .01). 
- 23 -FIGURES 
MEAN OVERALL IMPRESSION JUDGMENT AS A FUNCTION OF TARGET PERSON DESCRIPTION 
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The data revealed a significant difference between the kind (M =  4.41) and unkind 
primes (M = 3.35) when the target person description was mixed (F(l, 73) =  12.00, P < 
.001).  The difference between kind and unkind primes was  not significant in  the vague 
target person condition (M =  3.68 vs. M =  3.89) (F(1, 73) =  .47, p > .49). 
The data in  this  study perfectly matched our expectations. First, the assimilation 
effect of the mixed target person was much stronger compared to the assimilation effects 
obtained in  study  1.  This is  in  line with  a  number of other studies  (e.g.  Newman and 
Uleman 1990, Strack et al.  1993) suggesting that assimilation effects of priming are more 
likely  when  people  are  not  aware  of the  priming  event  at  the  time  they  make  their 
judgment (Higgins  1996). Also the main effect of target person description disappeared. 
Overall the mixed target person was perceived as kind as the vague target person. Finally, 
the perception of the vague target person was independent of the traits that were activated. 
- 24-Study 3 
In the previous studies, our expectations were partially built on the assumption that 
people  do  not  spontaneously  establish  actor-trait  links  when  they  encode  behavioral 
instances. When people were then asked to judge the target person they were expected to 
base their judgment on the retrieval of applicable behaviors. If, however, people do make 
an  actor-trait link at encoding and given that people tend to  rely on a previous inference 
instead of the stored behavioral instances (Carlston 1980, Srull and Wyer 1980, Stapel et 
al.  1997), the trait concepts that are activated at the judgment stage are expected to have 
no  effect on subsequent trait judgments. Ross et al.  (1977) for instance found that once 
people  constructed  an  explanation,  they  used  this  explanation  instead  of the  original 
information on which it was based. Similarly, Ostrom et al.  (1980) found that people made 
their  person  judgment  on  the  basis  of the  impression  formed  at  encoding,  without 
reference to the original behavioral information. And finally, Carlston (1980) showed that, 
when asked to make a trait inference after encoding mixed target person behaviors, people 
based their final impression on this inference instead of on the actual behaviors. 
Previous  studies  found  that  people  make  spontaneous  trait  inferences  when 
encoding behavioral information  about a person if they  are  motivated to  do  so.  When 
people were given impression formation instructions at encoding, for instance, they were 
found  to  establish  actor-trait  links.  When  people,  on  the  other  hand,  were  given 
memorization instructions, these personality trait inferences were not observed (Uleman 
and  Moskowitz  1994).  By  consequence,  we  expected  that,  when  people  have  a 
memorization  goal  at  encoding,  activated traits  would  result  in  an  assimilation  effect. 
When people have a impression formation goal at encoding, however, we expected them 
to use  this impression when judging. Consequently the  activated traits were expected to 
have no effect on the target person judgment. 
- 25 -Method 
Participants and Design 
Seventy-six undergraduates of Tilburg University participated in partial fulfillment 
of course  requirements.  The  design  of this  study  consisted  of two  between-subjects 
factors:  instructions (memorization vs.  impression) and prime valence (kind vs.  unkind). 
Like  in  the  previous  studies,  the  dependent  measure  was  the  kindness  judgment  and 
overall attitude towards the target person. 
Procedure and materials 
After participants entered the laboratory, they were told that they would participate 
in a sequence of tasks and were then brought to individual cubicles. They were requested 
to perform a sequence of tasks:  (a)  a reading task; (b) a word recognition task involving 
the  subliminal  priming  procedure;  (c)  the  judgment task  and  (d)  a  post-experimental 
questionnaire. At the end of the session, participants were thanked for their participation 
and debriefed. 
This procedure was very similar to study 2, except for the reading task. In this task, 
we  provided  all  participants  with  the  mixed  target  person  description.  Instead  of 
manipulating  the  target  person  description,  we  manipulated  the  instructions  that  the 
participants  received.  After the  target  person was  introduced  as  Diederik,  a  student in 
Tilburg,  the  participants  were  either  given  memorization  instructions  or  impression 
formation instructions. The participants with the memorization instructions were asked to 
memorize the  behavioral instances. The participants receiving the  impression formation 
instructions  were  asked  to  form  an  impression  of  Diederik.  All  participants  were 
subsequently asked to perform this task conscientiously as they would be asked questions 
about Diederik later on in the session. The participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the  two  conditions.  The  priming  task,  the  judgment  task  and  the  post-experimental 
questionnaire were identical to that of study 2. 
- 26 -Results 
We performed a 2 (instructions: memorization vs.  vague) x 2 (prime valence: kind 
vs.  unkind)  between-subjects  ANOV  A  on  the  kindness  ratings.  The  data  showed  a 
marginally  significant  interaction  between  instructions  and  prime  valence  (F(l,  84)  = 
7.68), p < .06). The means pertaining to this interaction are presented in figure 6. 
FIGURE 6 
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A  planned  comparison  on  the  kindness  measure  revealed  that  there  was  a 
significant difference between the kind prime valence condition (M = 4.50)  and unkind 
prime valence condition (M = 3.54) when participants were instructed to  memorize the 
target person descriptions (F(l, 84) = 10.02), p < .01). When participants were asked to 
form an impression of the target person, the primes had no differential effect (M = 3.90 vs. 
M =  4.13) (F(l, 84) =  .54), p > .46). The data also  revealed that people, after receiving 
kind  primes,  perceived  the  target  person  as  kinder  in  the  memorization  (M =  4.50) 
compared to  the impression formation condition (M = 3.90) (F(1,  84) = 3.69, p < .06). 
When exposed to unkind primes, on the other hand, the participants in the memorization 
condition (M = 3.54)  rated the  target person  as  less  kind than  those in  the impression 
formation condition (M =  4.13) (F(1, 84) =  3.69, p < .06). 
- 27 -We  also  computed  the  same  2  x  2  between-subjects  ANOVA  on  the  overall 
impression  ratings.  Again,  we  observed  a  significant  interaction  between  encoding 
instructions  and  prime  valence  (F(l,  84)  = 4.36,  P  <  .04)  The  planned  comparisons 
resulted in a marginally significant difference between the kind prime valence condition 
(M = 4.18) and unkind prime valence condition for the memorization instructions (M = 
3.41) (F(l, 84) =  6.30), p < .02). No such difference emerged for the impression formation 
instructions (M =  3.72 vs. M =  3.86) (F(l, 84) =  .20), p > .65). 
As predicted, the post-primed traits resulted in an  assimilation effect when people 
were asked to  simply memorize the behavioral instances. This provides evidence for the 
fact  that  people with  a  memorization  goal  spontaneously  refer traits  to  the  behavioral 
instances  and  that  subsequent  priming  with  traits  leads  to  selective  use  of congruent 
behaviors when jUdging. No effect of the activated traits was observed in the impression 
formation condition. When people are explicitly asked to form a target person impression 
at encoding,  they very likely used this impression, and not the stored behaviors, during 
later judgment tasks. 
General conclusion 
It has  been  well  accepted  in  the  social  cognition  literature  that  activated  trait 
knowledge  only has  an  effect on  the encoding of target  person information that  lacks 
evaluative clarity. More specifically, trait knowledge that is activated at the encoding stage 
has been shown to lead to either the disambiguation of ambiguous behavioral descriptions 
or the selective processing of mixed target person information (Stapel and Schwarz 1998), 
both resulting in an assimilation effect on subsequent target person judgments. Beyond the 
encoding stage, activated trait knowledge has been assumed to  have no effect on  target 
person judgments (e.g. interpretation/comparison model of Stapel et al.  1997). The current 
results however show that activated trait concepts can have a significant effect after the 
encoding stage. The present studies provide strong indications that subtle environmental 
cues lead to the selective use of previously stored prime-congruent behaviors, resulting in 
an  assimilation  effect on target person judgments. In  other words,  activated traits  very 
likely  make  congruent  behaviors  more  accessible  at  the judgment stage.  In  short,  we 
- 28 -propose  an  extension  of  the  two-stage  interpretation-at-encoding  and  comparison-at-
judgment model to  a three-stage model by  adding a retrieval stage.  This retrieval  stage 
precedes the comparison stage. When people are asked to make a person judgment, they 
will try to retrieve the applicable previously made inference or, in absence of such stored 
inference, previously encoded behavioral information. Activated trait concepts might then 
bias this retrieval of behavioral instances. 
Our findings  also extend other studies that already indicated the selective use of 
prime-congruent episodes. Reyes, Thompson and Bower (1980), for instance, showed that 
evidence that was more accessible simply because it was more vivid, was better recalled 
and had a greater influence on juror verdicts.  And Stapel and Schwarz (1998)  similarly 
found that people when primed at encoding based their judgment of a mixed target person 
on  prime congruent episodes.  In both articles  the  authors  attribute their findings  to  the 
differential attention paid to salient and prime congruent episodes, so that these episodes 
are  preferentially  perceived  and  processed.  In  our studies,  however,  the  nature  of the 
selective use is quite different. Knowledge categories are activated after the target person 
information is processed. By consequence, our findings are very likely due to differential 
retrieval instead of prime-congruent encoding.  In  this  sense our findings  correspond to 
those of Forgas and Moylan (1987) who showed that happy or sad movies influenced the 
departing  moviegoers'  answers  with  respect  to  a  wide  variety  of  topics:  political 
judgments, expectations about the future, judgments of responsibility and quilt and quality 
of life judgments. The authors identify two possible explanations for their results.  First, 
people might erroneously base their judgment on the activated mood. Next, it could also 
be that much of the judgment relevant information is  ambiguous so that mood-congruent 
categories  serve  as  interpretation frameworks.  This  second explanation  seems  unlikely 
though  since  disambiguation  of information  is  typically  found  at  encoding  and  not  at 
retrieval. Our results, however, favor an alternative explanation: it is not unlikely that the 
topic information people possess is mixed and that the activated mood makes congruent 
facts more accessible. 
Our results provide some evidence that the higher accessibility of stored prime-
congruent behaviors is indeed the underlying reason for the observed assimilation effect. 
When the target person was vague and no  congruent behaviors were available,  or when 
- 29 -people  were  motivated  to  already  form  an  impression  at  the  encoding  stage,  the 
assimilation effect disappeared. However, these results provide only indirect support. The 
question therefore arises to what extent accessibility differences are indeed the underlying 
mechanism for the observed post-prime assimilation effects. Future research could try to 
obtain more confirming evidence by using a dependent measure more directly capturing 
accessibility differences, like a recall task. 
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